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The concept of female modesty 
 
The Merriam-Webster dictionary (2004) offers two definitions of modesty: 
a) freedom from conceit or vanity, and b) propriety in dress, speech, or 
conduct. The concept has been described as a set of culturally determined 
values that relate to the presentation of the self to others and is closely 
related to the concept of body modesty that has been defined as the wish or 
requirement not to expose too much of the human body (Wikipedia, 2004). 
Modesty may thus be described as synonymous with chastity or purity of 
manners, “the sweetest charm of female excellence, the richest gem in the 
diadem of their honour” (Noah Webster, 1828). 
The most commonly used term for modesty in the Urdu language 
(Pakistan’s national language, also widely spoken and understood in India) 
is Haya. Besides modesty, Haya denotes many similar concepts such as: 
Sharm (shyness as well as shame), Ghairat (honour), Hijab (veil), Iffat 
(chastity) and Ijz (humility). Haya is originally an Arabic word for 
modesty, a term that has been mentioned in a number of traditions of the 
Prophet Muhammad, thus signifying its importance in Islam. For instance: 
 
Modesty brings nothing but good…(Al-hayaa laa ha’tiy illa 
bikhairin) (Bukhari, Muslim). 
 
Modesty is one portion of belief…(Al-hayaa shu’batun min al-
iman) (Bukhari, Muslim). 
 
The following verse of the Holy Qur’an is commonly quoted in 
support of female modesty and the related institution of seclusion for 
Muslim women:  
 
And say to the believing women that they should lower their gaze 
and guard their (sexual) modesty; and that they should not display 
their beauty and ornaments except what (must ordinarily) appear 
thereof; that they should draw their veils over their bosoms and 
not display their beauty save to their husbands, or their fathers or 
their husbands’ fathers, or their sons or their husbands’ sons, or 
their brothers or their brothers’ sons, or their sisters’ sons, or their 
women, or the slaves whom their right hands possess, or male 
servants free of physical desire, or small children who have no 
sense of sex; and that they should not stamp their feet in order to 
draw attention to their hidden ornaments. And O believers! Turn 
all together towards Allah, that you may attain bliss. (Qur’an 
24:31). 
 
The verse defines a specific code of conduct for a Muslim woman 
to maintain and guard her modesty in terms of eye contact, dress, 
ornamentation, and walking style. She is required to lower her gaze as a 
first step to guard her sexual modesty. She is also ordained to desist from 
unduly showing her adornment. She must cover her bosom and avoid 
stamping her feet to reveal what she hides of her adornment. The verse also 
defines a distinct protocol for a woman’s interaction with men who are not 
her Mehram (that is, not within the prohibited category of marriage) 
(Hu,ssain, 1987:143-157). 
The concept of modesty is closely associated with the concept of 
shame. The Pakistani equivalent of “shame” and “shyness” in the Urdu 
language is a single word Sharm. Despite the distinct nature of the 
emotions of shyness and shame, Sharm may mean both of these terms at 
the same time, interchangeably or separately, often hard to differentiate. In 
the first sense (shyness), a woman is generally perceived to be shy or 
inhibitive by nature. Shyness is considered to be an ornament for women. 
A woman who is not shy may be perceived as too blunt to be modest. For 
example, in his poetry, Akbar Allah Abadi (famous Muslim poet during 
British India) criticizes the modern Muslim woman who chose to be 
Shama-e-Anjuman (club chandelier) abandoning her role as a Charagh-e-
Khana (candle of her house). In the second-sense (shame), a woman is 
thought of bringing shame (Sharm) to her family and herself if she violates 
a social or religious norm. A Muslim woman is thus dictated to adopt both 
of these roles (shyness and shame) by a single powerful word—Sharm. 
The use of one word for two distinct emotions, however, makes it hard to 
distinguish one set of feelings from the other.  
The institution of female modesty has traditionally restricted a 
Muslim woman’s roles and status outside the four walls of her house. 
According to leading Muslim theologian of the 12th century A.D., Imam 
Ghazali, a Muslim woman should “not leave her spindle or her private 
apartment, nor look down on the street from her terrace” (Ghazali in 
Vivification des sciences de la foi). The concept has been more restrictive 
for women within societies marked by deep-rooted patriarchal customs and 
traditions such as India and Pakistan. Justice Aftab Hussain, former Chief 
Justice of Shariat (Islamic Law) Court of Pakistan, relates the following 
incident of his early college years: 
 
Back in 1934 when I was a student of the Intermediate (First 
Year) in the Bareilly College, my Professor of English once 
asked me: ‘Aftab! What is your opinion about girls’ education?’ 
Promptly I replied: ‘If you wish to make harlots of them, educate 
them in school.” The answer did not stun or surprise him. By that 
time, he had become accustomed to receiving such darts from 
members of the middle and higher classes among the Muslim 
Junta… My impromptu answer only articulated the feelings and 
views of the gentry of the town who had nothing but censure and 
reproof for that valiant champion of women’s lift. These were 
days when even my aged grandmother could not think of going 
out of the residential house even in a veil which covered her from 
head to toe (Hu,ssain, 1987: 1). 
 
Later in his life, Hussain, by virtue of direct study of the Qur’an, 
and Sir Muhammad Iqbal (renowned philosopher poet of Muslim India), 
changed his outlook and vision (p. 2), which was previously obscured by 
the customary seclusion of women and the inflexible rigidity of Taqlid 
(imitation without questioning) in religious matters. The incident, however, 
reflects a major issue in Islamic society: the rigid concept of modesty and 
sexual segregation that is rooted deep in the society (Syed and Ali, 2005). 
 
 
Muslim women at work 
 
Women have been traditionally confined in Chador (a type of veil, a big 
cloth to wrap around the body) and Chardiwari (four walls of the house) in 
Pakistani society. Popular idioms, customs and poetry—all signify the 
sanctity of women as “mothers,” “sisters” and “wives.” Those finding a 
space for themselves outside the sanctuary of Chardiwari are ridiculed and 
criticized. Following is the non-literal translation of two verses of Urdu 
poetry. The verses were written by Akbar Allah Abadi almost a century 
ago in British India and are still popular in the Muslim circles in India and 
Pakistan.  
 
 
 
Urdu: 
Bay Purdah Kal Jo Nazr Aieen Chand Bibyan 
Akbar Zameen Main Ghairat-e-Qomi Say Gad Gaya 
Poocha Jo Un Say Aap Ka Purdah, Who Kya Hua? 
Kehnay Lageen Keh Aql Pay Mardon Kee Pad Gaya 
 
English Translation (by the author of this paper): 
Yesterday, as I happened to see some unveiled (Muslim) women 
My national (read Islamic) ‘Ghairat’ (honour) was deeply hurt 
(As I) asked them, ‘What happened to your veil?’ 
(They) replied, ‘(Our) men have lost their wisdom’ (‘that’s why 
they allowed us to unveil ourselves’)  
 
These verses are frequently quoted in everyday life in Pakistan as 
an expression to humiliate unveiled urban woman. The Urdu equivalent of 
the word “woman” is Aurat, which itself means “the hidden thing.” 
Another similar word used for “woman” in Pakistani society is Mastoor, 
again meaning “the hidden thing.” The concept of seclusion and sexual 
segregation is thus rooted deeply in the customs and norms of Pakistani 
society.  
This gender segregation exists in almost all possible social and 
organizational contexts with only a few exceptions in urban settings. Even 
higher education institutes are no exception. Zubair (2003) reports her 
experiences as a teacher of English literature in a Pakistani university. Her 
initial efforts to bring feminist pedagogy and critical literacy awareness 
into the classroom faced stiff resistance. The resistance shown by her 
young students “created emotions in the classroom which led to intense 
debates and discussions about women’s role and women’s space within 
patriarchy” (p. 165). Zubair identifies three main reasons for students’ 
initial resistance to express their emotions in the class: a) sex segregation 
in Pakistani society. Despite mixed-sex classroom in the university, men 
and women sit in separate rows; b) strong resistance by women to sit and 
work in mixed-sex groups; and c) resistance by young men from rural 
backgrounds who felt embarrassed being taught by modern and anglicised 
women (pp. 165-166). Zubair’s (2003) study offers useful insight about the 
challenges faced by Pakistani women: 
 
Wajeda, 21, female, comments on the gender divisions and 
power-dynamics of the classroom and the university: ‘I felt 
awkward sitting with and talking to the boys when I first came to 
the university…I still feel awkward sitting with them or sitting 
next to them because it is not allowed in our religion’ (p. 167). 
 
Farhana, 22, female, in an informal conversation with her 
‘modernly’ dressed teacher: ‘Some girls do not like the way you 
dress…they say she wears tightly-fitted clothes…such clothes do 
not befit a teacher’s image…a teacher should be simple and 
decently dressed’ (p. 167). 
 
A female student mentions gender-based training through the 
Pakistani media: 
 
‘This is what is being implanted in our minds through the 
media…we are being trained from the very beginning to please 
men, either a father or a brother or a husband or a son…I mean 
what I want to do for myself I can’t, father won’t like it, son 
would think what my mom is up to…Why? This is the training. 
I’m talking about the training we’re given from the very 
beginning…look at the media advertisements…from every side 
family life, social set-up…this is the training’ (p. 169). 
 
Another female student describes her limited choice for 
employment: 
 
‘I know my father won’t allow me to take up employment after 
marriage…if I’ve kids…Okay? My priorities do not count. If I 
prefer not to have children after marriage I’m not allowed to take 
this decision’ (p. 169). 
 
A male student thus describes a practical problem that Pakistani 
families normally face in case both partners go to work: 
 
‘I’ll tell you something from my own observation in this regard. 
My cousins (women) are very well educated and one of them has 
joined Pak[istan] Air Force and her husband is also a pilot. After 
the 11 September incident a situation arose in our country for 
which the whole airbase had to be evacuated, and they were 
transferred to some other airbase and they were not allowed to 
have any servant to take care of the baby…because by then she’d 
given birth to a baby…both husband and wife had to go to their 
jobs and there was no one…no one left at home to look after the 
baby. So, I think that it should be decided before marriage 
whether women are going to take up jobs or not…whether it will 
affect their marital life or not’ (pp. 169-170). 
 
Despite some liberal laws for women in some parts of Islamic 
society, women’s role outside their houses remains highly restricted (Syed 
and Ali, 2005). Islamic laws and cultural traditions rule a woman “largely 
according to her age and marital status” (Minai,, 1981:xiv). A patriarchal 
code of ethics prevails in every sphere of life allowing greater freedom to a 
woman in her childhood and old age, but with numerous compulsion from 
her youth to middle age. Her main duty is to produce and care for 
legitimate heirs to her husband, hence the emphasis on regulating her 
activities during her reproductive years. This is also reflected in a low 
female enrollment rate in schools or colleges, especially after puberty, 
partly because of poverty, but also because of the parents’ wish to protect 
their daughters’ virtue and marriageability (p. 78). The boys in Islamic 
society “do not have to be supervised very closely, since their sexual 
behaviour cannot dishonour the family or compromise their chances for 
marriage” (pp. 83-84). It is thus perceived in the parents’ best interest to 
train their female offspring for her most glorified role, motherhood. 
The traditional concept of the separation of male and female space 
is popular in almost all parts of Islamic society. According to Maududi,, a 
leading Islamic scholar of the twentieth century, it is prohibited for women 
“to sit in the same gathering together with men and stare at them, or look at 
them in a manner which may lead to evil results” (Maududi, 1991). Even 
the educated urban woman, who enjoys more access to education and 
formal work opportunities, has not escaped “emotionally crippling 
traditions” prevalent in Islamic society. Thus a woman, who may be 
entrusted with the construction work and medical treatment, may not be 
“trusted with her own sexuality.” In a bid to retain their patriarchal 
privileges,  
 
men expect her to be educated and sophisticated and yet chaste and 
submissive. She cooperates in perpetuating the conflict-ridden 
image out of desire for security as well as fear of ostracism. 
Locked in their own certainties and contradictions, men and 
women try to sort out what they want from the indigestible 
avalanche of new influences in their lives, and to reconcile them 
with the old ways that they cannot or will not abandon (Minai, 
1981:78-79). 
 
In a family (read marriage) versus career choice, the career 
generally loses because society considers a woman’s job only peripheral to 
her primary role as a wife and a mother (Al-Saadawi, 1982; Syed and Ali, 
2005). The dilemma indeed becomes more complicated given the growing 
extinction of extended family in urban societies. Brought up to view 
housework as a feminine domain and a career as a privilege, a Muslim 
woman finds it hard to be a successful housewife and a career woman 
simultaneously. While she functions professionally at work, she readily 
resumes her traditional feminine role at home to serve her husband (Minai, 
1981:217). The educated woman thus pays a high emotional price for 
giving into the traditional perspectives about her role in the society. Yet, if 
she decides to carry on both the job and the housework without help, she is 
too overburdened to reach her creative peak and thus remains bitterly 
dissatisfied and emotionally perturbed. 
 
 
Moral values and social experience 
 
The term moral is often equated to behavioural conformance with social 
standards. The term guilt on the other hand is used indiscriminately to refer 
to a number of different aversive affective experiences. Aronfreed (1968) 
argues that specific cognitive structures determine one’s qualitative 
experience of the aversive changes of an affective state, which 
socialization attaches to its recognition of its own transgressions. 
Aronfreed mentions three types of cognitive structures—fear, 
guilt and shame—that may help in distinguishing among the aversive 
affective states in reaction to transgressions (p. 243). The structures are not 
mutually exclusive and may overlap to varying extents. All of these 
cognitive structures are simultaneously present in every society, but their 
intensity and incidence would vary with differences in patterns of 
socialization. For instance, a Muslim girl child by virtue of her social and 
early childhood experiences is likely to face the aversive state that is 
simultaneously characterised by fear, guilt and shame, depending upon the 
nature of her transgression. Her transgression may be a slight one, for 
instance, not wearing a Chador or headscarf in the presence of Mehram. Or 
it may be of a more defiant nature such as her decision to seek formal 
employment in a male-dominated organization. The higher the intensity of 
transgression, the higher the likelihood of her feelings of guilt, fear and 
shame in front of her society and her own person. According to Einarsen et 
al. (2003), some of these experiences may be personal in origin (such as 
name calling, insulting or ridiculing) while others may be organizationally 
derived (such as work type-gender type discrimination, assigning of 
demeaning work, excessive performance monitoring). However, the 
interpretation of such experiences and the corresponding feelings of shame 
and embarrassment remains a highly contextual phenomenon. 
There are several types of aversive states that may follow a 
transgression such as fear, guilt and shame. Fear may be described as a 
qualitative experience determined by the cognitive orientation of the 
subject (Aronfreed, 1968:244). The anticipation of being shamed or 
ridiculed can thus be classified as fear since it signifies a cognitive focus 
on a source of anxiety. Many reactions to transgression in Western 
societies (such as the Christian tradition of confession) are equally likely to 
occur in a cognitive context closer to fear. A Muslim working woman, for 
instance, remains fearful of the dishonour that she can bring to her family 
by indulging in anything perceived immodest by her society. She at the 
same time experiences anxiety and depression about the negative backlash 
by her mere presence and participation in a supposedly male economic 
order (Syed and Ali, 2005). 
The concepts of guilt and shame are closely associated, despite 
their significant differences (Harder and Lewis, 1986; Lutwak et al., 2001). 
As discussed, both may be categorised as aversive states that follow a 
transgression. Guilt is related to the quality of the transgressor’s affective 
experience as determined by the moral evaluation of transgression. Shame, 
on the other hand, is related to the transgressor’s experience as determined 
by a cognitive orientation toward the visibility of transgression (Aronfreed, 
1968:249). For instance, a Muslim woman who defies social and religious 
norms by stepping out of her house and doing a job with her male 
colleagues is vulnerable to both of these emotions. Her moral evaluation of 
the transgression (in view of popular concept of modesty and sexual 
segregation) makes her guilty of defying religious norms (Syed and Ali, 
2005). And due to the visibility of this defiance, she brings shame for 
herself and for her family.  
Shame is a self-referent emotion because of the centrality of 
individual understanding of the self in this emotional experience 
(Eisenberg, 2000; McNally, 2003). The concept remains largely under-
researched in medical circles despite its vast ability to damage personal 
identity, creating corresponding feelings of exposure, degradation, 
situational avoidance, and silence (Lewis, 2004; Davidoff, 2002). The 
concept is related to negative behavioural experiences including 
depression, self-degradation, interpersonal anxiety, and perfectionism 
(Lutwak et al., 2001). Due to existing structural barriers such as restriction 
on her mobility outside the four walls of her house, a Muslim working 
woman experiences feelings of shame and related negative behavioural 
outcomes. By working in the male order of formal employment, she 
experience “a self conscious awareness that is being viewed, or might be 
viewed, by others with an unflattering gaze” (Greenwald and Harder, 
1998:227). Her feelings of shame make her want to shrink from others 
(Trumbull, 2003). She suffers from humiliation that accompanies an 
“undeserved image of oneself,” which “can mobilize a conscious intention 
to right the wrong” (p. 234). The experience generates the internal concept 
of self as “no good,” where focus on her own person is completely on 
“self,” resulting in uncertainty, inability to think clearly, inability to talk, 
and inability to act (Lewis, 1992:35). Moreover, there is clear clinical and 
empirical evidence for the link between shame, guilt, depression and 
anxiety (Ghatavi et al., 2002; Harder et al., 1992). She thus remains 
vulnerable to the feelings of shame, guilt, depression, and anxiety—all due 
to her decision to work outside the four walls of her house. 
The essence of shame is a cognitive focus on the appearance that 
ought not to show. A Muslim woman’s very decision to step out of her 
house reduces her to a visible object of observation and criticism. She thus 
experiences shame in addition to fear and guilt by transgressing the Islamic 
code of modesty. Her feelings of vulnerability to observation are intimately 
associated with shame. For instance, many Muslim women from elite 
families in rural areas of Pakistan toss off their Burqa (extreme kind of veil 
covering a woman from head to toe) or Chadors as soon as they reach 
urban cities of Lahore, Karachi or Islamabad. The same women take care 
to be clad in their original Burqa when returning to their hometowns so 
that the transgression may remain invisible to their immediate society. 
Shame and fear are thus closely intertwined in Islamic society, as a 
cognitive focus on the visibility of transgression will blend with the focus 
on its punitive consequences for the transgressor. The phenomenon was 
clearly witnessed during the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan (Hirschkind and 
Mahmood, 2002). 
Men and women differ in the dominant direction of control that 
they experience in their interaction with their social environment 
(Aronfreed, 1968:329). The difference is attributable to their respective 
status in professional or social organizations (Aronfreed, 1961; Parsons, 
1953). Men and women in an Islamic order are expected to observe Islamic 
values that are somewhat different for both genders. As Doi (1989) 
explains, the code of modesty is practically more stringent for women than 
for men due to the evils present in the society. From a psychological 
perspective, the values that are relevant to the control of conduct (such as 
modesty in dress and conversation) can be changed substantially when one 
is in a stressful situation (Li,fton, 1961). The values may also be changed 
due to persuasion (such as religious concepts of modesty and virtue) and 
by a person’s conformity to behavioural demands (such as safeguarding 
family honour), which are initially discrepant with her personal values and 
by other ordinary modes of social influence (Brock and Bauss, 1964; 
Kelman, 1965). While the dimensions of cognitive structures are generally 
formed throughout the entire course of socialization in a Muslim woman’s 
lifetime, their roots are laid in the early patterns of social interaction in her 
home and family. 
Festinger’s (1957) concept of cognitive dissonance offers a 
relationship between external constraints over one’s behaviour and one’s 
exercise of internalised controls. A person is expected to find it distasteful 
or aversive to have two cognitions that are significantly inconsistent with 
one another. She will, therefore, be motivated to change one or both of her 
cognitions so as to balance them out. A modern Muslim woman thus finds 
it totally Islamic and modest to step out of her house and participate in 
formal education or employment just like her male counterparts (Zubair, 
2003). On the other hand, those who cannot take up this stress sooner or 
later leave their jobs to find shelter in the haven of their home and solitude. 
The above-discussed moral and social dilemma is characterised 
by a multi-faceted depression for workingwomen in Islamic society. These 
women feel powerless yet responsible for the events that went wrong in 
their workplace (and their families). Their guilt for their supposed defiance 
of the social and religious norms is exaggerated. They thus remain 
vulnerable to physical symptoms (such as sleeping or eating disorders) and 
cognitive and affective symptoms (such as passivity, confusion, 
worthlessness, shame and guilt). Traditional and reformulated 
psychodynamic theories consider guilt, shame and derision as both distal 
antecedents and central elements of the disorder (Zahn-Waxler et al., 
1991). There is sufficient evidence that females in general are more 
vulnerable to depression compared to their male counterparts. Nolen-
Hoeksema (1987) has offered a biological explanation for this 
phenomenon through comparative research on hormonal and genetic 
factors in males and females. From the affective perspective, a female is 
generally more accurate in her assessment of interpersonal sensitivity 
(Hall, 1978). The phenomenon makes a female more vulnerable to the 
feelings of depression, guilt and shame. 
 
 
Morality and emotions  
 
The concept of emotion regulation is complex, and its meaning has 
drastically changed over time. This meaning is indeed shifting at a rapid 
rate in our own time (Izard and Kobak, 1991). There are an increasing 
number of scientists researching the motivational, organizational, and 
adaptive functions of emotions (such as Barlow, 1988; Rozin and Fallon, 
1987). From personal and, by extension, social perspectives, the total 
suppression of ones’ emotions is neither a desirable nor a productive 
strategy. For instance, nobody would like to be devoid of feelings of 
sadness at the loss of a dear friend or family member, guilt for 
wrongdoing, or shame for inappropriate behaviour. However, the 
appropriateness or inappropriateness of one’s moral values and the social 
experiences that govern one’s emotions remain an issue in question. 
Social beliefs and attitudes have generally contributed to the idea 
that emotions should be brought under rather tight control. Religious and 
philosophical scholars have historically treated emotions as “evil forces 
that can contaminate or even destroy the mind and soul” (Izard and Kobak, 
1991:306). Religion thus categorizes one’s regulation and control of 
“negative emotions” as a sign of piety and goodness. For instance, the 
Islamic concept of modesty requires Muslims to negate their Nafs (Person) 
and Hawa (Personal Greed) to become close to the path of Allah (such as 
Qur’an 12:53, “Nor do I absolve my own self [of blame]: the [human] soul 
is certainly prone to evil, unless my Lord do bestow His Mercy: but surely 
my Lord is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful”). The Qur’anic ideals of Taqwa 
(Piety) and Sabr (Patience) are aimed to create self-restraint and a God 
fearing state in the lives of the faithful (Qur’an 103:1-3, 2:2). However, not 
all types of emotions are tabooed in religion. Some negative emotions have 
been exempted. For instance, the institution of Tauba (repentance) in Islam 
signifies one’s guilt over wrongdoing and righteous indignation at moral 
transgression (such as Qur’an 4:17, “Allah accept the repentance of those 
who do evil in ignorance and repent soon afterwards; to them will Allah 
turn in mercy”). The nature and intensity of guilt is thus represented by 
one’s conscience, which, in turn, is governed by one’s moral values. 
The term conscience traditionally refers to cognitive and affective 
processes that represent an internalised governor over an individual’s 
conduct (Aronfreed, 1968:2). The Greeks perceived moral judgment as an 
essentially rational phenomenon. For instance, Plato (The Republic) and 
Aristotle (Nichomachean Ethics) did not consider moral judgement in the 
powerful affective component that is today regarded as indispensable to the 
internalised control over social conduct. The affective core of morality (in 
contrast to other value systems) has been discussed by many theorists in 
the twentieth century (such as Ayer, 1935; Stevenson, 1944; Mackie, 
1995). Values are deemed moral when they address the desires and 
constraints that have direct implications for the welfare of others. Moral 
values thus convey a sense of attachment and obligation to other human 
beings, closely associated with the concepts of liberty, responsibility, 
authority and possession and distribution of material things (Aronfreed, 
1968). A general definition of the standards of value to be included within 
conscience, however, needs certain criteria. Liberally speaking, conscience 
includes evaluative standards of conduct, that is, behavioural dispositions 
shaped by one’s interaction with the social environment. The concept and 
applicability of conscience is, however, not restricted to moral judgment. 
For instance, it refers to value orientations that support self-denial of 
pleasure, effort in the face of adversity, and other self-directive expressions 
of behaviour commonly know as “Protestant ethics” (Weber, 1930) or 
“inner-direction” (Riesman et al., 1950). Moral judgement is thus an 
important component of multiple value systems that are now commonly 
regarded as the substance of conscience.  
It is established that the external contingencies of one’s social 
environment, which one generally learns and adopts in one’s childhood, 
exercise profound control over one’s personal behaviour through the 
course of socialization. A person’s behaviour is thus governed extensively 
by internal monitors, which in turn assume many functions of the external 
controls that originally established one’s behaviour in childhood. The term 
internalisation may be defined as “a process in which an internal cognitive 
model is formed for the representation of behaviour that was originally 
overt or public” (Vygotsky, 1962). The term refers to one’s adoption of 
social norms or role as one’s own, and to the resulting evaluative control of 
one’s behaviour by some of the most complex functions of cognitive and 
verbal processes (Kohlberg, 1969). The mechanisms of the internalised 
control of behaviour are superimposed upon, often displacing the 
functional characteristics of concrete external events (Aronfreed, 1968). 
For instance, a girl child in a Muslim family is likely to internalise the 
morally right behaviour as is expected of her by her society. Many such 
forms of human behaviour as the suppression of emotions, constraints on 
the manner and place of eliminative functions, are a result of initial 
acquisitions under conditions of relatively high magnitudes of aversive and 
other psychological experiences.  
There are two types of internal monitors that offer mediation of 
conditioned affectivity and the control of one’s own behaviour (Aronfreed, 
1968). The first monitor consists of behavioural cues directly inherent in 
one’s performance of an act, generally during one’s childhood. The second 
monitor comprises more complex information in cognitive processes 
related to the capacity to represent and evaluate personal behaviour and the 
external context. The cognitive control of affective states gradually 
emerges with advancing development in one’s life. Thus, cognition 
acquires more representational and anticipatory function. The affective 
states may be further classified into two categories: positive (pleasant) and 
aversive (unpleasant or painful). Schachter (1964) reported experiments 
illustrating the quality of a person’s affective arousal by information from 
the social environment. The distinction between positive and negative 
affective states offers the broad outline of the internalisation process in 
one’s personality. An understanding of the mechanisms of socialization 
thus needs a general understanding of the affective and cognitive 
components of learning.  
Learning, and subsequently one’s conduct, is shaped socially 
transmitted positive outcomes of one’s overt behaviour such as rewards 
and appreciation (Aronfreed, 1968). However, behaviour-contingent social 
learning is not the only source of the positive control of conduct. The 
pleasant affective contexts also serve as a model for imitation in one’s 
childhood. Both of these sources contribute to internalisation by the 
attachment of affective value to the intrinsic perceptual and cognitive 
correlates of one’s behaviour. Selective positive reinforcement of conduct 
often increases the chances of relative effectiveness of punishment in the 
suppression of non-compliance, when both positive and negative 
incentives serve the same motivational dispositions. Thus, a person’s entire 
experience of internalised behaviour is attributable to both positive and 
aversive controls. There is, however, some evidence of internalisation in 
the situational assessment of the suppression of behaviour that is under 
social prohibition—for instance, in the assessment of the conformity to 
rules in the absence of external monitoring (such as Sears et al., 1965; 
Grinder, 1962). In these situations, there is a large component of aversive 
control.  
Behavioural suppression has been broadly defined to include “any 
reduction in the probability of one form of behaviour, relative to the 
probabilities of other forms, as a result of punishment or other avenues of 
aversive learning” (Aronfreed, 1968:162). The suppression of an active 
form of behaviour, such the as confident interaction of a Muslim working 
woman with her male colleagues, offers an illustration of the 
internalisation of aversive control over social conduct. The phenomenon 
explains the typically shy and inhibitive nature of women in Islamic 
society. Early social experiences of a girl child (for instance, the way she is 
treated second to her male brother) establish her alternative dispositions, 
which curtail the development of certain emotions such as aggression, 
confidence and self-assurance (Whiting and Child, 1953).  
 
 
Emotion regulation and gender roles 
 
The regulation of emotions has held a prominent place in the scientific 
inquiry for a long time. Darwin (1872) conducted an extensive study to 
understand the expression of emotions in humans and animals. Freud’s 
(1926/1977) theory of psychosexual development deals mainly with the 
struggle between internal emotion impulses and the effort by the individual 
to regulate these emotions. The absence of emotional regulation results in 
psychopathology and anxiety. Many researchers today deal with the 
processes through which emotions are expressed, concealed and regulated. 
Accordingly, a major debate in emotion theory has been about the role of 
one construct (cognition) in the regulation of the other construct (emotion). 
Irrespective of the nature and the context of emotions, the issue 
remains: how to handle these emotions (Frijda, 1986). The reciprocal effect 
of altering cognitive activities through emotional states may be regulatory 
or dysregulatory depending upon the nature of adaptive effects. Many 
researchers have studied regulation through modification of emotion 
(arousal, goals, specific behaviours) by means of cognitive activity (such 
as Clark and Isen, 1981; Masters et al., 1981). There are two fundamental 
reasons for emotion regulation: personal (self-regulation) and social 
(emotion regulation in others) (Masters, 1991:186). The personal 
regulation resides in one’s own person and may not be easily observed by 
others, except in extremely stressful circumstances. Social strategies, on 
the other hand, focus on manipulating others’ emotional states to achieve a 
desirable consequence.  
Dodge (1989) defines emotion regulation as “the process by 
which activation in one response domain serves to alter, titrate, or 
modulate activation in another response domain” (p. 340). The type of 
regulation is the usual way in which children learn how to control 
emotional response and to become skilled at it (Kopp, 1989). Figure 11.1 
offers a conceptual model for emotion regulation in three forms: inter-
domain, intra-domain, and interpersonal emotional regulation. The intra-
domain type of emotion regulation also occurs early in life, but deals with 
the modulation of one aspect of responding in a particular domain 
according to another aspect of responding in the same domain (Porges, 
1991). Campos et al. (1989) suggest the importance of interpersonal 
emotion regulation that deals with one’s interaction and manipulation of 
one’s social environment. One’s social and organizational environment 
comprises many supportive and disruptive forces that have implications for 
the biological, cognitive and behavioural domains of one’s personality. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.1. A conceptual model for emotion regulation. 
(Source: Dodge and Garber 1991). 
 
 
Emotional reactions have been often seen as disruptive, irrational, 
biased and weak. Emotion thus becomes a deviation from intelligent or 
sensible, linked to the expressive arenas of life, instead of the instrumental 
goal orientation that drives organizations (Putnam and Mumby, 1993:36). 
Contemporary organizational behaviour theory reflects many of the 
assumptions about masculinity and rationality that are deeply embedded in 
traditional organizational discourse. Ross-Smith and Komberger (2004) 
propose that it is the early philosophical and sociological interpretations of 
reason and rationality that linked masculinity and rationality so closely and 
inseparably. 
 
 
The unexplored dimension of emotional labour 
 
The term emotional labour was first introduced by Hochschild (1983), who 
defines emotional labour as “the induction or suppression of feeling in 
order to sustain the outward appearance that produces the proper state of 
mind in others.” The labour “calls for coordination of mind and feeling, 
and it sometimes draws on a source of self that we honour as deep and 
integral to our individuality” (p. 7). Hochschild’s research and other 
subsequent studies in the field of emotional labour have repeatedly 
highlighted the job-type engenderment of different emotional roles within 
organizations: for instance, a caring flight attendant’s role by a female and 
an aggressive bill-collector’s role by a male. The interface between gender 
and emotional labour is a new area of investigation. Some of the empirical 
studies exploring this relationship have resulted in ambiguous findings 
(Pugliesi, 1999). Simpson and Stroh (2004) have recently used time-tested 
quantitative measures to evaluate the emotional labour of men and women 
in professional and managerial jobs. Part of their research was aimed at 
determining the nature of the interface among gender, emotional 
expression, and mental well-being. They found that women more often 
conform to feminine display rules, which require the suppression of 
negative emotions and the simulation of positive emotions.  
 
 The Traditional Approach The Contextual Approach 
Work role Work-role specific (people-
work such as nurses or flight 
attendants) 
Not necessarily work-role specific 
Focus Job content Job context  
Orientation Externally oriented—to 
produce an emotional state 
in another person 
Internally oriented—internal 
emotional struggle (Not just 
surface- acting) 
Duration Short termed; lasts only for 
the duration of contact with 
the clients 
Long termed; as long as societal 
and organizational circumstances 
exist 
Contact Face to face or voice to 
voice contact with the public 
Face to face or voice to voice 
contact with the public as well as 
the colleagues 
Affectivity The need to produce an 
emotional state in another 
person 
Not specially aimed at producing 
an emotional state in others 
Control The employer’s control over 
the emotional activities of 
employees 
Society’s as well as organization’s 
control over activities of 
employees (social and 
organizational acceptability issue) 
Example Caring business: A nurse is 
required to display 
appropriate emotion such as 
sympathy, and to suppress 
an inappropriate emotion 
such as boredom 
Islamic society: A Muslim 
working woman needs to adopt 
conflicting roles (modest woman 
and modern woman) at the same 
time to meet her social as well as 
organizational requirements 
 
Table 11.1. Emotional labour—traditional and contextual perspectives. 
(Source: Adapted from Syed and Ali, 2005). 
 
 
Men, on the other hand, more often adopted masculine display 
rules, which require the suppression of positive emotions and the 
simulation of negative ones. The engenderment of emotional labour is thus 
institutionalised in job-type and gender-type allocation (or discrimination) 
in the labour market. The influence of job-emotion match has been indeed 
acknowledged as a key influence in the selection process in organizations 
(Arvey et al., 1998; Grandey and Brauburger, 2002). However, in societies 
where (far beyond job-type gender-type discrimination) there is a general 
blackout or taboo on women’s employment, emotional interface between a 
working woman and the organization becomes rather complex. The 
phenomenon explains the emotional challenge that a Muslim woman faces 
by defying the “code of modesty” through her decision to work outside the 
four walls of her house. Her emotional struggle is not dictated by the 
nature of a specific job. Her very decision to work in a formal organization 
brings her face-to-face with a highly sensitive religious and social impasse. 
Both of these roles require her to display (or suppress) two conflicting sets 
of feelings such as shyness and confidence, fear and strength, and restraint 
and anger. Due to the Islamic concept of modesty and the related 
institution of sexual segregation, her organizational experiences generally 
comprise a blend of differentiating (such as fear and anxiety) and masking 
emotions (such as restraint and inhibition) instead of integrative ones (such 
as love, friendliness, pride and pleasure) (Kemper, 1984; Wharton and 
Erickson, 1993; Mann, 1997). 
The contextual dimension of emotional labour may be defined as 
the induction or suppression of feeling in order to sustain the appearance 
that is appropriate for the social and the organizational contexts. The 
labour requires appropriate coordination of mind and feelings to balance 
conflicting demands of the society and the workplace. Table 11.1 offers a 
comparison of the traditional and the contextual approaches of emotional 
labour. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The popular interpretation of the Islamic concept of female modesty 
encourages restraint and inhibition and the related emotions of fear, shame 
and guilt in Muslim women in their interaction with males who are not 
related to them. Consequently, the concept restricts Muslim women’s 
participation in the formal sector of employment outside the four walls of 
their houses. These women thus have to regulate their emotions in order to 
meet the conflicting demands of their social and organizational contexts. 
We have examined the strong interlink between moral values and the social 
experiences of Muslim working women and its emotional implications for 
them. The aversive states—fear, guilt and shame—that follow these 
women’s “transgression” (such as their decision to work outside the 
Chardiwari) restrict their roles and status in the domain of formal work. 
Their moral evaluation of the transgression makes these women guilty of 
defiance of the religious norms; and due to the visibility of this defiance, 
they remain vulnerable to the feelings of shame and embarrassment. 
Because of her early social experiences as a child (which may curtail the 
development of certain emotions such as aggression, power and pleasure), 
a Muslim girl is likely to internalise the morally right behaviour as is 
expected of her by her society. Many forms of behaviour, such as the 
suppression of emotions and constraints on the manner and place of 
eliminative functions, are a result of initial acquisitions under conditions of 
aversive and other psychological experiences. The phenomenon explains 
the typically shy and inhibitive nature of women in Islamic society. 
Finally, we conclude that Muslim women at work experience a different 
kind of emotion regulation, which is outside the traditional definition of 
emotional labour. We define the contextual dimension of emotional labour 
as the induction or suppression of feeling in order to sustain the appearance 
that is appropriate for the social and the organizational contexts 
simultaneously. The labour requires appropriate coordination of mind and 
feelings to balance the conflicting demands of the society and the 
workplace. The hypothesis has been subsequently verified through our 
field research in Pakistan, which has been published elsewhere. 
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